Английский язык для экономистов - Малюга Е.Н.
ISBN 5-469-00341-8
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G.3. Place the given below words and expressions into the appropriate columns, give their Russian equivalents and use them in your own sentences defining the perspectives for the Russian economic growth:
• to bog down the reforms;
• inflation;
• recovery;
• ad hoc taxes;
• growing fiscal deficit;
• rebound;
• to slash red tape;
• to diversify;
• boost;
• to promote innovations;
• to be stunted and distorted deregulation;
• to cut payroll charges;
• to abolish subsidies;
• to squander;
• sustainable growth.
Stimulus for the economic growth Hurdles for the economic growth
K Reading the English newspaper
H.l. Read the article and do the exercises.
Russia & the WTO: Crunch Time
Chnstopher Granville, "The Reuters"
The goal of Russian WTO accession in 2003, previously endorsed by Putin, is looking more ambitious than ever. The autumn negotiating and legislative sessions in Geneva and the Duma will be decisive. With elections in mind, Putin may balk at this fast-track timetable. Protectionist oligarch Oleg Deripaska has caught this change of mood with his call for a much slower track. Russia's fundamental transition prospects and progress will not be undermined simply by the fact of joining the WTO in 2005 rather than in 2003. However, any such delay would entail dangers and disappointments that create a leadership challenge for Putin. 234
Английский ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ экономистов
The main incentive for targeting accession at the WTO's next ministerial meeting in Mexico City in autumn 2003 is to ensure that Russia will become a full participant in the current lDoha Round' of multilateral trade talks. But this timescale always looked highly ambitious, and all the more so after the latest and fruitless Geneva negotiating round in June. For all their sensitivity, the negotiations on Russian import tariff levels and access to its service markets are the least of the problems, since agreements can be quickly struck if there is sufficient political will on both sides. Delays here will tend to be due to negotiating tactics. So there is nothing inherently alarming about the fact that the Russian negotiators showed no signs of movement at the June working party session in Geneva either on reducing protectionist tariffs in key sectors such as autos, aerospace and pharmaceuticals, or on lifting restrictions on foreign entry into the domestic financial services market. But the necessary Russian concessions on some or all of these matters would still mean overcoming some powerful vested interests at home.
Much more difficult even than this will be non-tariff barriers, and the general trade-related regulatory and legislative framework. Here, the key issues are Russia's low regulated energy tariffs seen as blanket industrial subsidies, and agricultural subsidies. On the regulatory front, Russia's trade policy regime still needs clarification on many points even before starting to negotiate commitments on its stability and/or amendment. But it is on the legislative front that the time factor is most acute. The autumn session of the Duma is due to address a whole range of fundamental legislation necessary for WTO accession. Key measures include the Customs Code, the liberalisation of currency controls and, in the area of non-tariff barriers, the law on technical regulation. But these bills will have to compete for parliamentary time in the thick of the annual budget round.
It will be clear from all this that Russia has a mountain to climb if it is to meet the target of WTO accession next year. It could be done. The key to a deal will lie in agreeing 'grace periods' after accession in which import tariffs and service market entry restrictions will be reduced, and domestic energy tariffs raised to acceptable levels. But Russia's entry prospects in 2003 will hinge on the remaining Geneva negotiating rounds, when drafting of the 'working party report' (the basis of the Protocol of Accession) is due to begin, spelling out Russia's commitments. Slow progress this autumn either in Geneva or in the Duma will most likely mean the postponement of Russian WTO membership until the 2005 ministerial meeting.
These stark realities seem to be making an impact. Putin spoke in July of three years as possibly a more realistic timetable, and this was echoed by Unit 13. Russia in the World Economy
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the WTO Secretary General, Mike Moore, who had previously been talking up Russia's rapid entry prospects. Although the government, tor its part, is ploughing on (it dedicated a special session to the issue on July 25), there is a sense that the political will necessary to make a decisive push on the WTO front this autumn may no longer be there. Given the obvious wrorries about the effect of WTO membership on employment, Putin's natural caution — reinforced by election considerations — may well prevail. Until now, the main business interest groups have paid lip service to the WTO accession goal as stated by Putin. But given the many and varied protect ionist interests, this was bound to change at the first sign of doubt in the Kremlin. So it was not surprising that aluminium and autos tycoon Deripaska broke ranks on August 5 with a call for the postponement of WTO entry until the second half of the decade — though it was surprising to see him breaking Putin's taboo on oligarch involvement in politics by adding an outspoken personal attack on German Gref.
